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I. INTRODUCTION
In FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme Court held that so-called “pay-for-delay” 
settlements—where a branded drug manufacturer settles patent litigation
against a generic drug manufacturer by paying the generic to delay its entry 
until sometime prior to patent expiry—may violate the antitrust laws.1  In
* © 2018 Saami Zain.  Assistant Attorney General, New York State Attorney General’s 
Office, Antitrust Bureau. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not
reflect those of the New York State Department of Law or the Antitrust Bureau.
1. 	  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
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doing so, the Court rejected the “scope of the patent” test used by some
appellate courts, which essentially held such settlements immune from 
antitrust liability absent claims that the litigation was a sham.2  That test
was based primarily on the rationale that because a patentee is granted the
lawful right to exclude all others from practicing the patented invention,
any anticompetitive effects resulting from such an agreement would be 
within the scope of the patent and thus immune from antitrust liability.3  The
Supreme Court rejected that logic, holding that “patent and antitrust policies
are both relevant” in evaluating the settlement’s legality4 and that “this
Court’s precedents make clear that patent-related settlement agreements
can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”5  Finally, the Court elaborated
on “five sets of considerations” in support of its holding that pay-for-delay
agreements may be unlawful.6 
Although Actavis settled the controversy over whether pay-for-delay
settlements may violate the antitrust laws, it lacked clear guidelines for 
evaluating their legality. As a result, lower courts have struggled in ascertaining 
when such agreements are illegal, particularly in situations when it was 
not obvious that a settlement contained an unlawful payment—for example, 
when the agreement only included non-cash benefits such as supply 
agreements, licenses, or extraneous collaborations.7  A relatively new provision 
being challenged is when a settlement provides for not only a license to
 2. Id. at 2230. 
3. Id.
 4. Id. at 2231. The Court explained: “A valid patent excludes all except its owner
from the use of the protected process or product . . . . And that exclusion may permit the 
patent owner to charge a higher-than-competitive price for the patented product. But an 
invalidated patent carries with it no such right. And even a valid patent confers no right 
to exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe.  The paragraph IV litigation
in this case put the patent’s validity at issue, as well as its actual preclusive scope. The 
parties’ settlement ended that litigation.  The FTC alleges that in substance, the plaintiff
agreed to pay the defendants many millions of dollars to stay out of its market, even though 
the defendants did not have any claim that the plaintiff was liable to them for damages.
That form of settlement is unusual.  And, for reasons [previously] discussed . . . there
is reason for concern that settlements taking this form tend to have significant adverse 
effects on competition.  Given these factors, it would be incongruous to determine antitrust
legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law 
policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Line Materials, Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948)). 
5. Id. at 2232. 
6. Id. at 2234. 
7. See, e.g., In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 2017); In re
Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig., 848 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2017); In re Loestrin 24 Fe 
Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 545 (1st Cir. 2016); In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., No. 
14 C 10150, 2016 WL 738596 , at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2016); In re Aggrenox Antitrust
Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 242 (D. Conn. 2015); United Food & Commercial Workers 
Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
160
ZAIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:03 AM      
 
    
 
     















   
  
  
    
 
    
    
 
      
   
   
   
  
[VOL. 55:  159, 2018] Update on Antitrust and Pay-for-Delay 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
allow generic entry prior to patent expiry, but also an agreement by the
branded company not to launch or separately license an “authorized
generic”—a generic drug approved under the branded drug’s application that
would compete for generic sales.8  These “No Authorized Generic” provisions, 
as they are commonly referred to, can be quite lucrative to a generic 
manufacturer, particularly if it results in the drug being the sole generic 
on the market for a significant time period.9  And because the agreement
is between competitors—whether actual or potential—the provision is 
essentially a non-compete provision, which antitrust law tends to subject
to greater scrutiny.  Indeed, although agreements not to compete are not 
categorically prohibited, in circumstances where they appear facially
anticompetitive they may be subject to an abbreviated analysis10 or even 
condemned as per se illegal.11  The increased prevalence of No Authorized 
Generic provisions in pharmaceutical settlements has accentuated concerns
 8. FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND 
LONG-TERM IMPACT 1 n.1 (“Authorized generic[s] . . . are drugs that are approved as brand 




9. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229; Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 273 
(4th. Cir. 2006) (“By selling an authorized generic during the exclusivity period enjoyed
by the first paragraph IV ANDA applicant, the pioneer drug maker prevents that applicant 
from winning all of the customers who want to switch from the branded drug to a cheaper 
generic form.”).
10. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–59 (1986) (finding
agreement among physicians to refuse to provide x-rays to insurers for auditing purposes 
in conjunction with claims forms found to be illegal under quick-look); NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88, 100 (1984) (holding restrictions on members
ability to negotiate television contracts, which limited output of televised sports programs,
found illegal under a quick-look analysis); N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d
346, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding an agreement by physician group that they would
only collectively negotiate with insurers unlawful under quick-look); Polygram Holdings 
v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 31, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding agreement between record labels to
suspend advertising on recordings of two prior “The Three Tenors” concerts—which would
compete with recordings of the newer concert—unlawful under quick-look). 
11. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (finding market 
allocation by competitors per se illegal); Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 
332, 347–48 (1982) (holding agreements among competing physicians setting maximum 
fees that may be claimed in full payment for health services provided to policyholders per 
se illegal); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927) (holding 
price fixing by competitors per se illegal).
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over how such provisions are—and should be—evaluated under current 
antitrust jurisprudence. 
In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, a case that was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court in 2016, offers the most 
developed arguments for the legality of No Authorized Generic provisions 
post-Actavis.12  While the primary focus in the lower courts concerned to 
what extent non-cash payments in Hatch-Waxman settlements were subject 
to Actavis, defendants advanced more substantive arguments before the 
Supreme Court.  First, the Lamictal defendants characterized the provision as
an “exclusive license” rather than a No Authorized Generic agreement.13 
According to defendants, such licenses are “common” and “procompetitive”; 
therefore, allowing antitrust liability would be both unwarranted and 
imprudent.14  Second, defendants contend that Actavis does not apply to
conduct expressly permitted under patent law, such as exclusive licenses.15 
Finally, defendants maintain that exclusive licenses are—or should be— 
afforded antitrust immunity.16  Although the arguments are not meritless, 
the author concludes that none support antitrust immunity for the challenged 
provision.
A. Background on Hatch-Waxman 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (Act), and its implementing
regulations, governs, inter alia, the manufacturing, sale, and marketing of 
pharmaceuticals in the United States.17  Under the Act, anyone seeking to 
bring a new drug to market must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) 
with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and provide scientific data 
demonstrating that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use.18 
Once an NDA is approved, FDA lists the drug, along with information 
about the claimed patents and periods of exclusivity, in its publication
“Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” 
commonly referred to as the “Orange Book.”19
 12. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 561–62
(D.N.J. 2014), vacated and remanded sub nom. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015). 
13. Id. at 562. 
14. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Manufacturers in Support
of Defendants-Appellees Urging Affirmance at 14, 20–23, 29, King Drug Co. of Florence, 
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 2:12-cv-00995). 
15. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, King Drug, 791 F.3d 388 (No. 12-cv-00995).
16. Id. at 25–28. 
17.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012). 
18. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566
U.S. 399, 404 (2012). 
19.  Aaipharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, amending 
the Act to encourage generic entry by permitting a quicker, easier means 
for generic drugs to come to market.20 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
companies seeking to market generic versions of a drug that has already
been approved pursuant to an NDA may obtain FDA approval by submitting 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to FDA and by
demonstrating their generic version is “bioequivalent” to the NDA.21  A
company filing an ANDA must address every patent listed by the NDA in
the Orange Book.22  Specifically, the ANDA filer must certify that: (1) no 
patent information is listed in the Orange Book for the proposed generic 
drug, (2) the listed patents have expired, (3) the listed patents will expire 
before the generic product is marketed, or (4) the patents listed are invalid 
or will not be infringed by the generic.23 When a generic company challenges
a patent’s validity or asserts non-infringement—referred to as a “paragraph
IV patent certification”24—it must also set forth “a detailed statement of 
the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed.”25 
Upon receiving a paragraph IV certification, a branded drug company 
that has a drug approved under an NDA may file patent litigation against 
the generic that submitted the certification, which has the effect of automatically
delaying FDA approval of the generic for thirty months or until the patent 
is held to be invalid or not infringed.26  In contrast, if the NDA holder does 
not file suit within forty-five days, the FDA may approve the ANDA
immediately, provided all other conditions for approval have been met— 
that is, the drug is deemed safe and efficacious and no other unexpired
 20. See Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 102, 98 Stat. 1585, 1594–95 
(1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)); Caraco, 566 U.S. at 405 (explaining
the Hatch-Waxman process was “designed to speed the introduction of low-cost generic drugs 
to market”).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).  A generic is “bioequivalent” to a branded drug when 
the same dose is administered, and the rate and extent of absorption does not differ
significantly between the two.  See Definitions, 21 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2016). 
22.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
23. Id.




25.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3)(D). 
26.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
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exclusivity has been granted.27  The FDA awards exclusivity to the first
generic drug manufacturer that files an ANDA challenging the branded
drug’s listed patents.28  During this 180 day generic exclusivity period, the
FDA may not approve any other ANDA for the same drug.29 
B. Background on Antitrust Law 
Antitrust laws are the “Magna Carta of free enterprise,” with the purpose
of protecting competition and consumers.30  The Sherman Act31 is the
cornerstone of these laws and proscribes both joint conduct among firms 
that unreasonably harms competition,32 as well as monopolization.33  In
examining whether conduct is unreasonable—and thus illegal—for antitrust
purposes, courts typically apply a holistic, fact specific approach termed
the “rule of reason,” which often entails evaluating the relevant industry,
the firms involved in the litigation, the nature of the conduct being challenged, 
pro-competitive business justifications for the conduct, and the actual and 
likely effects of the conduct.34  However, because this analysis is extensive
27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(f)(2); Kaiser Found. 
Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If a patent
holder fails to bring an infringement suit within forty-five days of receipt of a Paragraph
IV notification, it loses the right to the thirty-month automatic stay . . . .”).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 
1303, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
29.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Teva, 595 F.3d at 1305. 
30. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).  Consumer 
welfare is the primary focus of antitrust laws. See e.g., Spanish Broad. System of Fla, Inc.
v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1071 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001); K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v.
Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995). 
31. See generally Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
32. Id. § 1.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits certain joint conduct that harms 
competition, providing in part, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” Id.  Despite its broad, prohibitive terms, 
the Supreme Court has long held that section 1 only condemns “unreasonable restraint[s].”
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 89 (1910). 
33. 15 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in part, “[e]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”  Id. 
34. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The 
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy 
competition.  To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint 
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.  The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.”). 
164
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and often very time consuming, courts have articulated circumstances when 
the analysis may be truncated or even obviated.35  In Actavis, the Supreme 
Court applied the “rule of reason” to Hatch-Waxman patent settlements.36 
C. Lamictal Litigation 
Lamotrigine is used primarily to treat epilepsy and bipolar disorder37 
and was first approved by the FDA in 1994.38  GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
sells and markets the drug as Lamictal®, in both chewable and non-chewable
tablet forms.39  GSK claimed a patent on the drug’s active ingredient, U.S.
Patent No. 4,602,017 (‘017 patent), which was filed on February 27, 1984
and expired on July 22, 2008.40 
In April 2002, Teva was the first of several generic manufacturers to
file an ANDA seeking to market generic lamotrigine, and was thereby awarded
180-day generic exclusivity.41  After Teva submitted a Paragraph IV
certification—asserting the ‘017 Patent was either invalid, unenforceable, 
or not infringed by its proposed generic—GSK timely filed suit, triggering 
the statutory thirty month stay of FDA approval for Teva’s generic lamotrigine
ANDAs.42  In late January 2005, the District Court “ruled that the patent’s
main claim, for the invention of lamotrigine, was invalid.”43  Shortly after— 
and prior to the court making a ruling on the validity of the patent’s remaining
35. N. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here are certain agreements
or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming 
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.”).  See 
also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 757 (1999); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 
476 U.S. 447, 457–58 (1986) (finding conduct unreasonable without an elaborate “Rule 
of Reason” inquiry). 
36.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2226 (2013). 
37. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 
396 (3d Cir. 2015). 
38. Lamictal–Approved Treatment for Epilepsy and Bipolar, DRUG DEV. TECH.,
https://www.drugdevelopment-technology.com/projects/lamictal-by-gsk/ [https://perma.cc/
5WER-Y7L3].
39. See King Drug, 791 F.3d at 393. The non-chewable formulation has achieved
far greater sales than the chewables, which are worth $2 billion in annual sales, compared 
to chewables, which have less than $50 million in annual sales. See id. As a result, this article
focuses only on the non-chewable formulation.
40. Id. at 396. 



















   
 
  
    
 
     
   
 
  
     
  
  
   




      
 
   
 
claims—the parties settled.44  Pursuant to the settlement, Teva was allowed 
to market “generic lamotrigine tablets on July 21, 2008, if GSK received
a ‘pediatric exclusivity’ extension, or on March 1, 2008, if GSK did not.”45 
Thus, if GSK obtained pediatric exclusivity, as it did,46 Teva agreed it would 
not launch its generic until the day before the patent expired, and GSK 
agreed that it would not launch an authorized generic for six months post 
patent expiry—thereby allowing Teva to be the sole provider of generic 
lamotrigine tablets during its 180 day exclusivity period.47  Although it
does not appear that GSK expressly promised not to launch an authorized
generic,48 the settlement provides Teva with an exclusive license, “including 
as to GSK and its Affiliates and Third Parties with respect to Generic
Equivalents.”49 
In February 2012, Lamictal Direct Purchasers filed an antitrust action 
against GSK and Teva, alleging their settlement contained an unlawful
reverse payment in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.50  In
the District Court, the primary legal dispute was whether Actavis applied 
to settlements that did not “involve an exchange of money.”51  The District 
Court held that it did not and thus dismissed the case.52  On June 26, 2015,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Actavis
applies to non-cash consideration.53  According to the Third Circuit , “no­
44. Id.
 45. Id. (footnote omitted) (“With a pediatric exclusivity extension [granted], the
patent would still have expired on July 22, 2008, but the FDA would [not have been allowed 
to approve] ANDAs filed by competing generics until after January 22, 2009.”). 
46. JACQUELINE H. WARE, OFFICE OF DRUG EVALUATION, NDA REGULATORY FILING 
REVIEW 2 (2008), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2009/022251s000_
Admincorres.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN6Y-EJ2G].
47. King Drug, 791 F.3d at 411.  The settlement also granted Teva rights to an
early—and exclusive—launch of generic lamotrigine chewables. Id. at 393.  However,
because revenues for the chewables were alleged to be negligible in comparison to the 
tablets—$50 million in comparison to $2 billion in annual sales—the real value and
consideration given in the settlement related to the tablets. See id.
48. Because most of the settlement is private, it is not entirely clear whether or not 
GSK expressly promised to launch an authorized generic. 
49. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 562 (D.N.J. 
2014), vacated and remanded sub nom. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015). 
50. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995(WHW), 2012 WL 
6725580, at *1, *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012). 
51. Lamictal, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 568. 
52.  The district court actually ruled on the matter twice: once based on pre-Actavis
circuit law in Lamictal, 2012 WL 6725580, at *1, and then later under Actavis. Lamictal, 
18 F. Supp. 3d at 563. 
53. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 
394 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We believe this no-AG agreement falls under Actavis’s rule because
it may represent an unusual, unexplained reverse transfer of considerable value from the 
166
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AG agreements are likely to present the same types of problems as reverse
payments of cash” and may therefore be unlawful under Actavis “when it
represents an unexplained large transfer of value from the patent holder to 
the alleged infringer.”54 
In February 2016, defendants filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme 
Court, framing the issue as to whether an exclusive license is subject to
Actavis.55  According to defendants, the challenged provision is merely
a “routine” and “well accepted” early entry exclusive license permitted under 
Actavis, as well as expressly allowed under the patent laws, and thus
not unlawful under the antitrust laws—either under Actavis or otherwise.56 
After being invited to weigh in, in October 2016, the Solicitor General 
submitted a brief recommending that the Court not review the case because
it was not the best vehicle for addressing antitrust scrutiny of an exclusive 
license in the context of Hatch-Waxman settlements, as the challenged
provision was not an exclusive license in form or substance.57  On November
7, 2016 the Supreme Court denied certiorari.58 
II. ANALYSIS
Since Actavis, lower court review of Hatch-Waxman settlements involving 
non-monetary compensation has been mixed.  Concerning exclusivity 
provisions in particular, most of the analysis has generally focused on
patentee to the alleged infringer and may therefore give rise to the inference that it is a 
payment to eliminate the risk of competition.”).
54. Id. at 403–04.  “The anticompetitive consequences of this pay-for-delay may be
as harmful as those resulting from reverse payments of cash.  If the brand uses a no-AG 
agreement to induce the generic to abandon the patent fight, the chance of dissolving a 
questionable patent vanishes (and along with it, the prospects of a more competitive market).
As with a reverse payment of cash, a brand agreeing not to produce an authorized generic 
may thereby have ‘avoided the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement.’ 
In addition, when the parties’ settlement includes a no-AG agreement, the generic also 
presumably agrees to an early entry date that is later than it would have otherwise accepted.
And during this time, the brand’s monopoly remains in force.  Once the generic enters, 
moreover, it faces no competition with other generics at all.”  Id. at 405 (footnote omitted) 
(citation omitted) (quoting FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013)). 
55. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15 (“What the Third Circuit termed 
a ‘no-AG’ clause . . . was in fact an exclusive license . . . .”). 
56. Id. at 2. 
57. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, 19, 20, SmithKline Beecham 
Corp. v. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016) (No. 15-1055). 
58. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388
(3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016). 
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how—and to what extent—Actavis applies.  The Lamictal case is one of the 
few cases where substantive arguments were advanced on the antitrust analysis 
of such provisions.59 
Throughout the Lamictal litigation, both the characterization and legality
of the settlement’s exclusivity provision were disputed.  Defendants argued
that because the provision on its face provided Teva with an “exclusive
license” to generic lamotrigine and contained no monetary compensation,
it was merely a typical, unobjectionable early entry exclusive license.60 
According to defendants, not only was the settlement not a pay-for-delay
agreement subject to Actavis, but it was immune from antitrust liability
because exclusive licenses are expressly authorized by the Patent Act.61 
Plaintiffs, in contrast, contended that apart from lacking a cash payment, 
the settlement was a common pay-for-delay case: Teva agreed to dismiss 
its suit challenging GSK’s patent in exchange for, inter alia, GSK allowing 
Teva to launch during GSK’s exclusivity period and agreeing to forego its
right to launch an authorized generic until after the expiration of Teva’s 
180-day exclusivity—thereby making Teva the sole generic during that time 
period.62  The parties’ conflicting views are largely due to three central issues, 
which will be address infra: (1) when is an exclusivity provision an “exclusive 
license,” (2) does Actavis apply to exclusive licenses or other conduct 
59. See supra Section I.C.
60. Memorandum in Support of the Teva Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Direct 
Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 22, In re Lamictal
Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995(WHW), 2012 WL 6725580 (D.N.J. Dec. 6,
2012) (No. 12-995), 2012 WL 11921677 (“Read together, plaintiffs’ allegations amount
to no more than the claim that Teva was permitted an exclusive early entry license for the 
sale of generic lamotrigine products.  But such a license, without more, cannot be subject 
to antitrust scrutiny.”); Teva Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Direct 
Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 5, Lamictal, 2012 
WL 6725580 (No. 12-995) (“Exclusive early entry licenses are expressly permitted under 
the antitrust laws and such licenses are a commonplace element of the patent system.”). 
61.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 25–28.  “Applications for patent, 
patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The 
applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and 
convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any
specified part of the United States.”  35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).  According to defendants,
this provides antitrust immunity to the settlement. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 15, at 25–28; see also Brief of Appellees Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. and
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,  Inc., 2014 WL 2206174 at *34, King Drug Co. of Florence, 
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1243) (“A patent 
licensing agreement that grants exclusivity to a particular market segment, even to the 
exclusion of the patent holder—which is all a so-called ‘no-AG’ provision does—is not 
actionable.  Such exclusivity is a license term specifically authorized by the Patent Act.”)
(emphasis omitted).
62.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 6–10. 
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authorized by patent law, and (3) how are exclusive licenses evaluated under 
antitrust law? 
As the Court of Appeals, Solicitor General, and plaintiffs in Lamictal
noted, the exclusivity provision was likely not an “exclusive license,” 
notwithstanding the settlement’s characterization as one.63  Rather, as only 
one day of the patent life remained at the time Teva was permitted to
launched its generic, the vast majority of the agreed upon non-compete— 
or “exclusivity”—period was not protected by patent rights.  And although
defendants advance creative arguments for why the pediatric exclusivity
granted for the drug is “equivalent” to an extension of the patent,64 it
certainly is not the best factual case.  Nonetheless, given the increased
prevalence of these provisions—and that future settlements could easily
be drafted and structured so as to provide a better factual case—the issue
is worth addressing.65 
A. When is an Exclusivity Provision an “Exclusive License”?
Because many of the arguments made in Lamictal are predicated on
representing the No Authorized Generic provision as an exclusive license,
it is useful to examine that characterization.  Unfortunately, none of the 
parties in the litigation addressed the issue in much depth but, rather, made
their conclusion based on a rather superficial analysis.66 However, relying 
63. King Drug, 791 F.3d at 406 n.27. 
64. See e.g., Brief of Appellees Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. and Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., supra note 61, at 37 (“Courts routinely view this blanket 
[pediatric] exclusivity as equivalent to a patent extension.”); id. at 41 (comparing pediatric 
exclusivity with patent exclusivity).
65. Indeed, at least one other case being currently litigated has made very similar
arguments in defense of its Hatch-Waxman settlement.  See, e.g., Actavis Defendants’
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 20–21, In re Intuniv Antitrust 
Litig., No. 1:16-cv-12653-ADB (D. Mass. filed Dec. 30, 2016) (“What DPPs characterize 
as a ‘no AG’ agreement would be nothing more than an exclusive license from Shire to
Actavis to market the generic version of Intuniv for a certain period of time before Shire’s 
patents expire. . . . [B]ecause exclusive licenses are expressly authorized by the Patent 
Act, they cannot be challenged as reverse payments under Actavis.”).
66.  In addition to the Agreement expressly granting an “exclusive license,” defendants 
argued that because it also prevented GSK from launching its own generic, the license was 
in fact exclusive. See Memorandum in Support of the Teva Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 19, In re
Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995(WHW), 2012 WL 6725580 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 6, 2012) (No. 2:12-cv-00995-WHW-CLW), ECF No. 71-1 (“Teva was given an
 169




   
 
  






   
   





   
    
 




     
  
   
   
     
 
   
  
 
       
   
    
solely on how the provision was characterized is clearly inadequate, as
both antitrust and patent law eschew form over substance in such matters.67 
Rather, similar to an antitrust rule of reason analysis, determining one’s
property interest in a patent post-transfer typically requires evaluating various
factors, including the intent of the transfer, the rights and obligations granted
and retained, the legal context, business realities, and the purpose and manner 
in which the license was granted.68 
Reflecting the flexibility of business needs, a license transfer can range 
from a bare-bones non-exclusive license to an outright assignment of all 
patent rights.69  A non-exclusive license, which is essentially a promise not 
to sue for infringement,70 places little, if any, restrictions on the patentee’s 
rights vis-à-vis the patented invention.71  With a “sole license,” the patentee 
retains all rights subject only to the rights granted to the sole licensee.72 
exclusive license to market generic Lamictal . . . and an exclusive license by definition
meant that GSK would not also launch a generic product in addition to its branded product.”). 
In contrast, plaintiffs averred that because GSK retained the right to practice the patent via
selling Lamictal it ipso facto could not be exclusive.  See Brief of Appellees Teva 
Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., supra note 61, at
42, 44. 
67. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 193 (2010) (“[T]he Sherman Act . . . 
‘is aimed at substance rather than form.’”) (quoting United States v. Yellow Cab, Co., 332
U.S. 218, 227 (1947)); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Imagine Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 466–
67 (1992) (“Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual 
market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.”); Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead 
Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Determining whether a licensee is an exclusive 
licensee or a bare licensee is a question of ascertaining the intent of the parties to the
license as manifested by the terms of their agreement and examining the substance of the
grant . . . . The use of the word ‘exclusive’ is not controlling; what matters is the substance
of the arrangement.”).
68. See, e.g., Azure Networks v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“We must also consider a non-exhaustive list of rights for determining whether a licensor
has transferred ‘all substantial rights’ to the licensee . . . .”); Textile Prods., 134 F.3d at 1484. 
69. 301 Ownership/Assignability of Patents and Applications [R-07.2015], USPTO.GOV 
(Jan. 24, 2018, 5:19 PM) [hereinafter Patents and Applications], www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/pac/mpep/s301.html [https://perma.cc/FX9N-92SQ] (“As compared to assignment 
of patent rights, the licensing of a patent transfers a bundle of rights which is less than the 
entire ownership interest, e.g., rights that may be limited as to time, geographic area, or field of
use.”).
70. WiAV Sols. v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A] so-
called ‘bare licensee’ holds nothing more than a promise from the patentee that the patentee
will not sue the licensee for practicing the patented invention.”).
71. XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN, ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ & DANIELLE CONWAY-JONES, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SOFTWARE, AND INFORMATION LICENSING: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.III.E.2.B, at 5–56 (2018). 
72. 2-15 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 15.33
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed.) (“In a sole license situation, the licensor either retains the right 
to continue operating under the subject matter of the license or prior licenses granted are 
170
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Finally, in the prototypical exclusive license, “the licensor may not license
to another or itself exercise the rights being licensed.”73  As a practical 
matter, however, the distinctions between the varying license types are
more nuanced.  As explained by one treatise, although “[s]ome exclusive 
licenses are as limiting as their name suggests . . . . [m]ost exclusive licenses, 
however, do not grant such encompassing exclusivity.  They instead grant 
exclusive rights for a given use or context.”74  Moreover, the above definitions
may place too great an emphasis on the transfer and retention of rights, 
given that exclusive and non-exclusive licenses may transfer less than all 
rights, for example, it may be limited to a geographic region or field-of-use.75 
Unfortunately, there is insufficient publicly available information to
determine whether the challenged provision in Lamictal was in fact an
exclusive license.  However, the facts and business realities strongly suggest
that it was not an exclusive license, as the license was of nominal value— 
being only for a single day—in contrast to the agreement not to launch an
authorized generic, which lasted for Teva’s FDA-granted 180-day exclusivity
period.
preserved, but the licensor agrees to refrain from granting further licenses to any third
party other than the sole licensee during the term of the sole license.”) (emphasis omitted).
73. NGUYEN, GOMULKIEWICZ & CONWAY-JONES, supra note 71; see also Patents 
and Applications, supra note 69 (“An exclusive license may be granted by the patent
owner to a licensee.  The exclusive license prevents the patent owner (or any other party 
to whom the patent owner might wish to sell a license) from competing with the exclusive
licensee, as to the geographic region, the length of time, and/or the field of use, set forth 
in the license agreement.”).
74. NGUYEN, GOMULKIEWICZ & CONWAY-JONES, supra note 71; see also MILGRIM 
& BENSEN, supra note 72, at § 15.08 (“The Federal Circuit has at times given ‘exclusive 
license’ a somewhat broader meaning in the context of determining standing to sue for 
patent infringement than the term is given in licensing practice.”).
75. Compare Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (finding the license was not exclusive due to the retention by licensee of certain
rights), with WiAV, 631 F.3d at 1265–67 (holding the license grant was exclusive, despite 
retention of rights).  See also MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 72, at §15.08 (“A field of
use license can be exclusive, and sufficient to bestow constitutional standing on the 
licensee to sue infringers acting within the field, even though other licensees can grant 
licenses outside the field of use.”); NGUYEN, GOMULKIEWICZ & CONWAY-JONES, supra
note 71 (“Exclusive licenses may grant rights akin to an assignment of rights within the 
field of exclusivity.”).
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B. Evaluating the Scope and Application of Actavis
A central dispute post-Actavis is ascertaining the decision’s scope and 
application. In Lamictal, defendants made two primary arguments to support 
their contention that Actavis was a “narrow decision” that only applies to
“unusual” Hatch-Waxman patent settlements.76  First, they averred that rather
than rejecting the scope of the patent test, the opinion merely limited it.77 
Second, they maintained that Actavis does not apply to conduct “expressly
authorized by the Patent Act,” which they contended includes the challenged 
exclusivity provision.78  Neither of these arguments are persuasive.
Although Actavis may not have provided the clearest guidance on how 
to evaluate the legality of Hatch-Waxman settlements, neither the developing 
lower court case law nor the opinion itself support a narrow interpretation. 
Indeed, although lower courts have been divided on numerous issues 
concerning the application of Actavis, the majority of courts have interpreted
the decision broadly.79  And this view is consistent with the opinion’s broad 
language and purpose.  The Actavis court took pains to explain it rejected 
the scope of the patent test because it failed to consider both antitrust and 
patent policy in evaluating the legality of the challenged agreement—a point 
broadly applicable to all patent settlements—not just to Hatch-Waxman
cases.80 As articulated by the Court of Appeals’s decision in Lamictal, given 
Actavis’ unambiguous rejection of antitrust immunity,81 attempts to resuscitate
or offer a modified version of the scope of the patent test are dubious at best. 
76.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 4. 
77. Id. at 23 (“Actavis applied two clear limits on the patentee’s immunity from 
antitrust suit . . . . [A]ctions may run afoul of the antitrust laws when they fall into one of
two categories: (a) those that use the patent toward an end other than securing value from
the patented discovery itself; and (b) those that use a means other than the patent to promote the
monopoly of the patent.”). 
78. Id. at 4, 26. 
79. For cases where the courts held Actavis is not limited to cash, see supra note 7.
80. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225, 2231 (2013) (“It would be 
incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive 
effects solely against patent law policy, and not against procompetitive antitrust policies 
as well. . . . And indeed, contrary to the Circuit’s view that the only pertinent question is 
whether ‘the settlement agreement falls within’ the legitimate ‘scope’ of the patent’s 
‘exclusionary potential,’ this Court has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both 
relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust 
law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”) (citation omitted) (quoting FTC v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2012)). 
81. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 
407 n.29 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The defendants’ arguments are much like those rejected by the 
majority in Actavis.  The disagreement in the Court was fundamental.  In the dissenters’
view, ‘a patent claim cannot possibly impose unlawful anticompetitive harm if the patent
holder is acting within the scope of a valid patent and therefore permitted to do precisely 
what the antitrust suit claims is unlawful.’  The dissenters viewed the majority as ‘imposing 
172
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The argument that Actavis is inapplicable to conduct expressly permitted 
under the patent statute is predicated upon a misreading of Actavis and the 
Patent Act.  Defendants make much of the language in Actavis suggesting 
one reason antitrust immunity was rejected for pay-for-delay settlements 
is that patent law does not “expressly or by fair implication” grant a patentee 
the right to pay off a competitor to delay competition.82 Arguing that because 
exclusive licenses are expressly authorized by the Patent Act, it is averred
that they cannot be governed by Actavis.83  Defendants make too much of
this language, however, which was primarily to address one point made by 
the dissent.  At most, this is but one consideration in evaluating the legality
antitrust liability based on the parties’ subjective uncertainty about a legal conclusion,’ namely, 
whether a patent is valid (and it is one or the other), because ‘the majority seems to think
that even if the patent is valid, a patent holder violates the antitrust laws merely because
the settlement took away some chance that his patent would be declared invalid by a court.’”) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2244). 
82. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233 (“What does appear novel are the dissent’s suggestions
that a patent holder may simply ‘pay a competitor to respect its patent’ and quit its patent
invalidity or noninfringement claim without any antitrust scrutiny whatever . . . . The dissent
does not identify any patent statute that it understands to grant such a right to a patentee, 
whether expressly or by fair implication.”) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 2243 (Roberts, 
J., dissenting)); see also id. at 2231 (“[T]he Court in Line Materials explained that ‘the 
improper use of a patent monopoly,’ is ‘invalid’ under the antitrust laws and resolved the 
antitrust question in that case by seeking an accommodation ‘between the lawful restraint
on trade of the patent monopoly and the illegal restraint prohibited broadly by the Sherman
Act.’  To strike that balance, the Court asked questions such as whether ‘the patent statute 
specifically gives a right’ to restrain competition in the manner challenged; and whether
‘competition is impeded to a greater degree’ by the restraint at issue than other restraints 
previously approved as reasonable.”) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Line
Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310–11 (1948)). 
83. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 3 (“Embedded in Actavis is a
line between conduct that is authorized by patent law even though it might restrict competition 
in the near term (such as the grant of an exclusive license), which is not subject to antitrust 
challenge for that reason, and the alleged unusual reverse payments at issue there, which
the Court emphasized were not authorized by law.”); see also id. at 4 (“[A]n indispensable 
part of [a patent] right is the ability to grant licenses, including those with exclusivity
terms.  Actavis preserved this bedrock of patent law when it amplified the line—already 
developed in this Court’s doctrine—between conduct that is authorized by patent law (such as
the grant of an exclusive license) and the alleged unusual, large reverse cash payments at 
issue there.  The alleged reverse payment in Actavis was subject to further examination under
the antitrust laws precisely because of the absence of ‘any patent statute that . . . grants such a
right to a patentee, whether expressly or by fair implication.’  That is not the case here,
where the agreement merely reflected an exercise of the patentee’s express statutorily-
granted right to grant an exclusive license.”) (citations omitted) (quoting Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2233). 
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of pay-for-delay agreements.  The opinion’s unequivocal rejection of antitrust
immunity militates against placing too much emphasis on this comment. 
Similarly, reliance on Section 261 of the Patent Act84 is mistaken.  First, 
Section 261 does not expressly authorize the challenged provision in Lamictal, 
but rather merely grants patentees the right to grant a license “to the whole
or any specified part of the United States”—in other words, a territorial 
license.85  Second, even if section 261 were directly applicable to the 
challenged provision, any argument that this, by itself, confers antitrust 
immunity would be inconsistent with the prevailing views expressed by
treatises,86 case law,87 and the enforcement guidelines88 that territorial
restrictions are evaluated under traditional antitrust principles. Finally,
the argument proves too much, suggesting that an express authorization
of conduct by one law thereby provides immunity under entirely separate, 
distinct laws having very different purposes.89 But just as the grant of legal
rights incident to ownership of real property does not provide blanket 
immunity for all uses of the property under any other applicable laws— 
84. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, 
shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.  The applicant, patentee, or his assigns 
or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his 
application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States.”).
85. Id.; see also Am. Indus. Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enters., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 
32, 36–37 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (“Section 261, strictly construed as these decisions mandate,
permits a patentee to impose on the licensee territorial restrictions on the distribution of
the product.”).  While the exclusive license in Lamictal has territorial restrictions—being 
limited to the United States—the challenged provision of the license is the agreement by
GSK not to launch a generic—not the territorial aspect—which is not covered under § 216. 
86. See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 33.03[A], at 33–22 (3d ed. 2017). 
87. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 272 (1963) (rejecting 
per se treatment for territorial allocation between manufacturer and distributors, requiring 
instead that the lower court “ascertain[] the effect upon competition of the particular territorial
restraints in suit”); Int’l Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 792 F.2d 416, 429 (4th Cir.
1986); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 
1979); United States v. CIBA Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118, 1150 (D.N.J. 1976). 
88. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 (2017).
89. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 
407 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e believe the fact that the Patent Act expressly authorizes licensing
does not necessarily mean it also authorizes reverse payments to prevent generic competition.”);
cf. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942) (“Since patents are privileges 
restrictive of a free economy, the rights which Congress has attached to them must be strictly
construed so as not to derogate from the general law beyond the necessary requirements 
of the patent statute.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“Microsoft’s primary copyright argument borders upon the frivolous.  The company claims an
absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual property as it wishes . . . . That is no 
more correct than the proposition that use of one’s personal property, such as a baseball
bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.”).
174
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for example, nuisance, tort, or environmental—rights granted by the Patent 
Act do not provide immunity under all other laws. Indeed, such deference 
would arguably be even more inappropriate for patent law, which primarily 
grants the right to exclude others from practicing the patented invention, 
rather than granting the patentee affirmative rights to use the invention.90 
C. Evaluating Exclusive Licenses under Antitrust Law 
The primary failing in the arguments advanced by the Lamictal defendants 
is that even if the challenged provision were a bona fide exclusive license, 
it would not be exempt from antitrust scrutiny.  Although various legal 
and policy arguments were advocated in support of the claim that “licensing 
agreements should not be second-guessed case-by-case under the antitrust 
laws,”91—many of which were made and rejected in Actavis—scant case
law has been provided in support.92 
There is no justification for granting antitrust immunity for exclusivity 
provisions in Hatch-Waxman settlements, regardless of how they are structured 
or characterized.  First, given the Actavis court’s sweeping language and 
clear rejection of the scope of the patent test, continued advocacy for 
immunity seems rather unavailing and ineffectual.93  Second, granting immunity
for anticompetitive use of intellectual property is contrary to decades of
90. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945) (“The patent grant is not 
of a right to the patentee to use the invention, for that he already possesses.  It is a grant of 
the right to exclude others from using it. . . . By the very terms of the statute the grant is 
nothing more than a means of preventing others, except under license from the patentee, 
from appropriating his invention.”).  Pharmaceuticals are a particularly illustrative
example of this distinction.  A patent provides no right to sell a drug in the United States,
because—regardless of any patent rights one may claim—approval by the FDA is required 
prior to have any affirmative right to sell a drug in the United State. See Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012). 
91. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 21; see also Brief of Appellees
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., supra note 61, 
at 22 (stating that under Actavis, “absent such a large and unexplained payment, parties 
are expressly permitted—and even are encouraged—to settle their patent disputes via settlement
containing an early-entry license.”).
92. Even the Lamictal defendants conceded that a valid patent may be used in an
anticompetitive manner.  See Brief of Appellees Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. and 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., supra note 61, at 22 (“As the Court in Actavis stated, 
courts have struck down patent licenses only when those licenses are ‘overly restrictive
patent licensing agreements’—including situations where parties improperly used patent
licenses to collude and pool patents, fix prices, and/or harm competitors.”) (emphasis added). 
93.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013) 
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Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court has consistently evaluated 
antitrust liability for the exercise of intellectual property based on a review 
of the factual and legal basis of the conduct at issue, rejecting any 
categorical immunity.94  And this is consistent with views expressed by 
lower courts,95 academics96 and the enforcement agencies.97
 94. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 186 (2010) (stating that exclusive
trademark license between NFL and Reebok “must be judged under the [flexible] Rule of
Reason”); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 47, 50 (1990) (“[A]greement that gave
BRG an exclusive license to market HBJ’s material [such that] HBJ would not compete 
with BRG in Georgia and that BRG would not compete with HBJ outside of Georgia . . . .
was unlawful on its face.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 
7 (1979) (stating that despite provisions in Copyright Act expressly permitting blanket 
licenses, blanket license would be judged under antitrust rule of reason); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 
388 U.S. 350, 355 (1967); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 195 (1963); 
United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378 (1952); Timken Roller Bearing Co. 
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) (discussing that allocation of territories 
incidental to trademark licensing contracts were subject to antitrust scrutiny); United States v.
Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 402 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
95.  See, e.g., King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791
F.3d 388, 407 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A]s we read the [Actavis] opinion, even exclusive licenses
cannot avoid antitrust scrutiny where they are used in anticompetitive ways.”); New York
v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638, 660 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Defendants argue that their conduct does 
not violate antitrust law because they have merely ‘exercised rights afforded by the Patent 
Act.’  But patent law gives Defendants a temporary monopoly on individual drugs—not a 
right to use their patents as part of a scheme to interfere with competition ‘beyond the
limits of the patent monopoly.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting Line Materials, 333 U.S. at 
308); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001); CSU, LLC. v.
Xerox Corp. (In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.), 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.”); 
B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating license 
restrictions “are contractual in nature and are subject to antitrust, patent, contract, and any 
other applicable law”); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d
639, 644–45 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating exclusive trademark licensing agreement subject to
rule of reason, because “[e]ven constitutionally protected property rights such as patents 
may not be used as levers for obtaining objectives proscribed by the antitrust laws”)
(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 576 n.11 (1972); Krehl v. Baskin-
Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying rule of reason to
exclusive trademark licensing scheme and citing the possibility that “licenses were merely
facades to mask an allocation of markets by pre-existing competitors”); Ohio-Sealy 
Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[I]f Sealy’s license 
agreement and its conduct thereunder amounted to substantial limitations on manufacturers’ 
sales territories, a per se violation existed.”).
96. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 86, at 7–26 (“Assuming the patent is valid, the
Patent Act expressly permits exclusive licensing, but it seems clear that [this] fact alone
does not render them immune from antitrust scrutiny.”) (footnote omitted).
97. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 88, at 16 (“In the vast 
majority of cases, restraints in intellectual property licensing are evaluated under the rule
of reason.”); id. at 20–21 (“[T]he licensor may grant an exclusive license, or one or more
partially exclusive licenses (such as territorial or field-of-use licenses), which limit the 
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The few cases cited by the Lamictal defendants and others in support of
immunity are dated, factually distinguishable, and have been mostly limited
to their facts. A case from the early twentieth century seems to be the origin 
of the claimed legal authority.98 E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow
Co. involved a patent pooling arrangement between various patentees of 
certain farming equipment that transferred their patents to a single, newly 
formed patent holding entity authorized to manage and grant licenses to
the patents.99 The primary issue before the Bement Court was the legality
of a resale price restriction in one of the licenses provided by the patent 
holding entity.100  Notwithstanding resale price restrictions being per se
antitrust violations at the time, the Court held that the licenses were not
unlawful because a patentee has an “absolute freedom in the use or sale
of rights under the patent laws.”101  While this absolutist view on the exercise
of patent rights was reflected in a few subsequent cases,102 it was short-lived.103 
United States v. General Electric Co. seems to be the primary case cited 
in support of antitrust immunity for licensing practices, but it is far from 
convincing.104 General Electric involved a distribution scheme for patented
incandescent lights by means of offering conditional licenses to over 21,000
ability of the licensor to license others and possibly also to use the technology itself.
Generally, such exclusive licenses may raise antitrust concerns only if there is a horizontal
relationship among licensors, or among licensees, or between the licensors and its licensee(s).”). 
98. See generally E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
99. Id. at 76–78, 85. 
100. Id. at 88–89. 
101. Id. at 91.  Today, of course, all resale price restraints—whether patented or
not—are subject to the rule of reason. See e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 877–78 (2007); State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 3–5 (1997). 
102. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (“The 
inventor is one who has discovered something of value.  It is his absolute property. He 
may withhold the knowledge of it from the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages
and benefits which the statute promises to him who discloses to the public his invention.”); 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 40 (1903) (“The patentee has the sole right of using
and selling the articles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing with them at all.
Inasmuch as he has the right to prevent people from using them or dealing in them at all,
he has the right to do the lesser thing; that is to say, to impose his own conditions.  It does
not matter how unreasonable or how absurd the conditions are.”).
103. Beginning with Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 
243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917)—which overruled A.B. Dick—and Straus v. Victor Talking
Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917), the Supreme Court began taking a more critical view 
of the use of patents to impede competition.  See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp.,
316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942) (“[I]t will not do to say that since the patentee has the power to 
refuse a license, he has the lesser power to license on his own conditions.”).
104. See generally United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
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agents.105  Rejecting the government’s challenge that the licenses and agency
distribution scheme were a per se illegal sham to control the downstream 
sales price of the product, the Supreme Court held that the licenses and the
“genuine contracts of agency” did not violate the Sherman Act.106  The Court,
citing Bement, thus seemed to uphold the validity of nearly any license 
condition unilaterally imposed by a patentee that is within the “scope of
his patent rights.”107  However, General Electric has generally not been
broadly interpreted, but rather limited to its facts.108  Instead, subsequent
Supreme Court cases have continued to evaluate antitrust challenges to
the exercise of intellectual property rights under traditional antitrust 
principles.109  For example, in United States v. Line Materials Co., the
Supreme Court rejected antitrust immunity for patents used to fix prices 
between competitors.110  The Line Materials court also seemingly sought 
to harmonize General Electric with its antitrust jurisprudence by offering
the following: “[W]here a conspiracy to restrain trade or an effort to
 105. Id. at 478. 
106. Id. at 488. 
107. Id. at 485 (“It is only when [a patentee] adopts a combination with others, by
which he steps out of the scope of his patent rights and seeks to control and restrain those 
to which he has sold his patented article in their subsequent disposition of what is theirs,
that he comes within the operation of the Anti-Trust Act.”).  Given Actavis’s rejection of
the scope of the patent test—one might question whether General Electric is still good law 
on this issue.
108. Over the years, the Supreme Court has both declined to expand upon the case 
and has limited its application.  For example, as recently as May 2017, the Supreme Court 
held that the Federal Circuit had misread General Electric as supporting a limited view of 
the exhaustion doctrine. See Impression Prod. v. Lexmark Int’l, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1534 
(2017).
109. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (deciding that 
exclusive trademark license between NFL and Reebok “must be judged according to the 
flexible Rule of Reason”); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 50 (1990) (ruling that 
market allocation by competing bar review companies effectuated in part by exclusive licenses 
to copyrighted materials and trademarks per se illegal); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10, 15–16, 19 (1979) (stating that despite provisions in Copyright 
Act expressly permitting blanket licenses, blanket license would be judged under antitrust rule
of reason); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 101–03 (1969);
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 350 (1967) (ruling conspiracy to fix prices of
trademark licenses per se illegal); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); 
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) (allocating territories
incidental to trademark licensing contracts subject to antitrust scrutiny); United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (finding unlawful conspiracy to fix prices of 
gypsum and control its sale and distribution via acquiring patents and granting licenses 
with similar terms and fixed prices); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280,
282 (1942) (declining to follow General Electric and condemning agency agreements 
between various manufacturers of patented building material as per se illegal).
110. United States v. Line Materials, Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) (“[T]he possession
of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any exemption from the provisions 
of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.”). 
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monopolize is not involved, a patentee may license to another to make and 
vend the patented device with a provision that the licensee’s sale price
shall be fixed by the patentee.”111  Lower courts have similarly largely rejected 
interpreting General Electric to afford any type of antitrust immunity for 
anticompetitive use of intellectual property.112  Finally, Actavis’s clear 
rejection of the scope of the patent test undermines the legal premise behind 
Bement and other cases relied upon in support of immunity based on a patent 
grant. 
Second, even if one were to conclude that antitrust immunity for exclusive
licenses may be appropriate in certain circumstances, Hatch-Waxman
settlements are a poor candidate for such protection.  As an initial matter, 
the mere fact that these are horizontal agreements between actual or potential
competitors suggests immunity is improper.113  Moreover, given that many—
including the current FDA Commissioner—have criticized pharmaceutical
companies for engaging in anticompetitive conduct to delay generic entry,114
 111. Id. at 304 (emphasis added); see also id. at 308–10 (“During its term, a valid 
patent excludes all except its owner from the use of the protected process or product. . . . 
As we have pointed out, a patentee may license others to make and vend his invention and
collect a royalty therefor. . . . The Sherman Act was enacted to prevent restraints of
commerce but . . . . [t]he monopoly granted by the patent laws is a statutory exception to 
this freedom for competition . . . . It is not the monopoly of the patent that is invalid.  It is
the use of that monopoly, improperly.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
112. See e.g., New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 660 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“Defendants argue that their conduct does not violate antitrust law because they have
merely ‘exercised rights afforded by the Patent Act.’  But patent law gives Defendants a 
temporary monopoly on individual drugs—not a right to use their patents as part of a scheme
to interfere with competition ‘beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.’”) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Line Materials, 333 U.S. at 308); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 407 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001); CSU, LLC. v. Xerox Corp. (In re Indep. Serv.
Orgs. Antitrust Litig.), 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000); B. Braun Med., Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 644–45 (10th Cir. 1987); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice 
Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 1982); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy,
Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1978).
113. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 88, at 14 (“[T]he 
Agencies ordinarily will treat a relationship between a licensor and its licensee, or between 
licensees, as having a horizontal component when they would have been actual or potential 
competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the license, even if a vertical relationship 
also exists.”); see also id. at 21 (“Generally, such exclusive licenses may raise antitrust 
concerns only if there is a horizontal relationship among licensors, or among licensees,
or between the licensors and its licensee(s).”).
114. Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How Pioneer
Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug
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immunity for Hatch-Waxman settlements would be especially inappropriate.
Finally, a prominent treatise has even argued that No Authorized Generic 
agreements could potentially be more harmful than the cash payment in 
Actavis, even suggesting that such agreements should receive more rather
than less scrutiny.115 
III. CONCLUSION
Ever since Actavis held that Hatch-Waxman patent settlements could 
violate antitrust laws, companies entering into such settlements have
endeavored to structure and characterize settlements in ways that minimize
potential antitrust liability.  Thus, settlements involving significant cash 
payments are rare today.  Rather, consideration from the branded drug
manufacturer to the generic now tends to be more subtle and indirect, for 
example by: (1) entering into generous supply or distribution agreements— 
such as where the generic becomes a distributor or supplier at significantly
higher rates than prior/other suppliers or distributors; (2) granting the generic
additional, unrelated license(s) on favorable terms—for example, for other 
products or in other markets; or (3) entering into collateral agreements that
may involve entirely different products or markets or ventures—for example, 
where the branded manufacturer agrees to fund or assist in a research or 
development collaboration that does not appear consistent with its own
strategy. 
This article evaluates No Authorized Generic provisions, a fairly recent
but increasingly prevalent provision used in Hatch-Waxman settlements.
In these provisions, the branded company typically both grants a license
to the generic and agrees not to launch an authorized generic for a certain 
period of time.  Although many have criticized these provisions as 
anticompetitive non-compete agreements, others have defended them as 
Market, 29 J. LEGIS. 21, 25–26, 29 (2002); Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical 
Patents, 4 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 145, 155, 178 (2004); Jayne O’Donnell, FDA Chief 
Says Drug Makers are Gaming the System to Slow Generic Competition; Vows Action, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 15, 2017, 5:38 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/ 
2017/08/15/fda-chief-says-drug-makers-gaming-system-slow-generic-competition-vows­
action/568698001/ [https://perma.cc/YX8F-Y7W6].
115. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, at pt. 2046 (Wolters Kluwer
Supp. 2016) (“No Authorized Generic’ agreements in fact place a second market exclusion
agreement (i.e., generic vs generic, for 180 days) on top of the first one, which was at issue 
in Actavis itself (pioneer versus generic for the term of the settlement).  The outcome is
more anticompetitive than a large cash payment for delay. . . . provision compensates the
generic with something far more troublesome [than cash]—namely a second market
division that serves to keep prices higher during the 180-day period when other generic 
firms are unable to enter the market.”).
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a procompetitive resolution to years of patent litigation. In the Lamictal
litigation, defendants went even further in defending the legality of these 
provisions by (1) characterizing them as typical exclusive licenses rather
than non-compete agreements, (2) arguing that such provisions are not subject 
to Actavis, and (3) arguing that because exclusive licenses are common
and often procompetitive, that they should be immune from antitrust.  Most 
of these arguments do not carry the day.  Even if a particular No Authorized 
Generic provision were deemed a bona fide exclusive license, there is no
legal support for immunizing it from antitrust scrutiny.  Rather, as with 
most restrictions, it would be subject to standard antitrust rule of reason
analysis. Nevertheless, even though the Lamictal defendants’ arguments 
in favor of antitrust immunity should fail, the effort to characterize and 
structure Hatch-Waxman settlements using exclusive licenses may not be 
entirely in vain, as courts tend to give greater deference to patents—and thus 
patent licenses—than non-compete agreements between competitors. 
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